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Auction Law, auctioneer, auctioneers, auctions, bid calling, bidders, buyer commission, buyer's premium, consent, contract, Jonathan K. Wu, knowledge, net to seller, seller commission, sold
Since Christie’s and Sotheby’s introduced the buyer’s premium in 1975 in England, and soon after (1977) in the United States, the buyer’s premium has been part of the auctioneering landscape in the United States.
We wrote about the buyer’s premium some time ago, and today wish to evaluate how the buyer’s premium translates, as a net effect, into seller commission and net to the seller.
Our work centers on this question — if one auctioneer charges 15% seller commission and another charges 15% buyer’s premium — how can we compare these two pricing structures to find which results in more net to the seller.
Some work was completed on this topic by Jonathan K. Wu (Wu), Director of Liquidity Services, Inc. in 2008:
Wu concluded that:
“A sales commission of 1% reduces the seller’s revenue more than a 1% buyer’s premium. In fact, as the sales commission increases, its negative impact on the seller’s revenue accelerates when compared to the buyer premium.”
An example of Wu’s analysis would be as follows:
- Seller A hires Auctioneer A who charges Seller A 15% seller commission and no buyer’s premium. The auction totals $10,000 and Seller A nets $8,500.
- Seller B hires Auctioneer B who charges Seller B no seller commission and 15% buyer’s premium. The auction totals $10,000 + 15% = $11,500 and Seller B nets $10,000.
Using Wu’s formulas, the “net effect of the buyer’s premium” in terms of seller commission can be calculated as follows:
- Seller A pays a net seller commission of 15.00%
[(10,000 – 8,500)/10,000] - Seller B pays a net seller commission of 13.04%
[(11,500 – 10,000)/11,500]
Further, to demonstrate Wu’s assertion that as the seller’s commission increases, it has an accelerated effect on the net to seller compared to the buyer’s premium.
Let’s say Auctioneer A charges 30% seller commission (instead of 15%) and Auctioneer B charges 30% buyer’s premium (rather than 15%). For that $10,000 auction, we see the following:
- Seller A pays a net seller commission of 30.00%
[(10,000 – 7,000)/10,000] - Seller B pays a net seller commission of 23.08%
[(13,000 – 10,000)/13,000]
As Wu might suggest, when we double (100%) the seller commission from 15% to 30%, the equivalent buyer’s premium increase from 15% to 30% only affects the seller by an actual increase of about 77%.
However, this analysis begs another question … for our Seller A, do those bidders only bid up to $10,000 when for Seller B they too bid up to $10,000 knowing they will be surcharged?
Why would Seller A’s buyers not bid higher than Seller B’s buyers since they pay no buyer’s premium? Wu’s analysis suggests that the hammer price is the same, regardless of the use of a buyer’s premium.
Is Wu’s analysis flawed? Selling at auction is not a one-sided picture, where we can adjust costs associated with buying, and not expect buyers to modify their behavior. If Wu’s analysis was correct, there would be no limit to what auctioneers could charge as a buyer’s premium. Why not 5,000%?
Taking a stab at correcting Wu’s analysis, let’s assume that buyers do modify their bidding given a buyer’s premium compared to no buyer’s premium.
- Seller C hires Auctioneer C who charges Seller C 15% seller commission and no buyer’s premium. The auction totals $10,000 and Seller C nets $8,500.
- Seller D hires Auctioneer D who charges Seller D no seller commission and 15% buyer’s premium. The auction totals $8,695.65 + 15% = $10,000 and Seller D nets $8,695.65.
Using this revised view, the buyers in Seller D’s auction bid less than $10,000 to compensate for the 15% buyer’s premium, thus bidding just as much in total as Seller C’s buyers; the “net effect of the buyer’s premium” in terms of seller commission can be calculated as follows:
- Seller C pays a net seller commission of 15.00%
[(10,000 – 8,500)/10,000] - Seller D pays a net seller commission of 13.04%
[(10,000 – 8,695.65)/10,000]
Further, to demonstrate if Wu’s assertion remains correct that as seller’s commission increases, it has an accelerated effect on the net to seller compared to the buyer’s premium.
Let’s say Auctioneer C charges 30% seller commission (instead of 15%) and Auctioneer D charges 30% buyer’s premium (rather than 15%). For that $10,000 auction, we see the following:
- Seller C pays a net seller commission of 30.00%
[(10,000 – 7,000)/10,000] - Seller D pays a net seller commission of 23.08%
[(10,000 – 7,692.31)/10,000]
What appears here to be clear is that indeed the buyer’s premium has a less than “face value” effect when expressed as a net seller commission — just exactly as Wu stated — but the actual net to seller is not adjusted upward nearly to the extent as Wu suggested if buyers adjust their bidding according to total cost of purchase.
Looking back, let’s compare Sellers A & B against Sellers C & D.
- Seller B earned $1,500 more than Seller A by employing a 15% buyer’s premium instead of a 15% seller commission.
- Seller D earned only $195.65 more than Seller C by employing a 15% buyer’s premium instead of a 15% seller commission.
Lastly, how do bidders actually calculate the buyer’s premium into their bidding? I asked a long-time auction attendee the other day about an item worth about $1,000.
I asked him what he would bid if we charged him a 15% buyer’s premium. His reply? “Well, I could only bid $850 as I would have to deduct the 15% you’re making.” Actually, he could bid up to almost $870 ($20 more) but that calculation is not overly obvious.
If this is the actual behavior of bidders — that they deduct the buyer’s premium from the total they wish to pay — then the actual net to seller is the same for a 15% seller commission and a 15% buyer’s premium.
If buyers miscalculate the buyer’s premium effect — from the gross rather than the net — then our comparison looks like this:
- Seller E hires Auctioneer E who charges Seller E 15% seller commission and no buyer’s premium. The auction totals $10,000 and Seller E nets $8,500.
- Seller F hires Auctioneer F who charges Seller F no seller commission and 15% buyer’s premium. The auction totals $8,500 + 15% = $9,775 and Seller F nets $8,500.
Using this further revised view, the buyers in Seller F’s auction bid less than $10,000 to compensate for the 15% buyer’s premium (but calculate it based on the gross, rather than the net) thus bidding less in total than Seller E’s buyers; the “net effect of the buyer’s premium” in terms of seller commission can be calculated as follows:
- Seller E pays a net seller commission of 15.00%
[(10,000 – 8,500)/10,000] - Seller F pays a net seller commission of 13.04%
[(9,775 – 8,500)/9,775]
In this last view, Auctioneer E receives $1,500 in commission (15%) and Auctioneer F receives $1,275 in commission (13.04%). In other words, if bidders behaved in this fashion:
- Charging a 15% seller commission results in the seller receiving $8,500 in net proceeds, and the auctioneer making $1,500 in commission.
- Charging a 15% buyer’s premium results in the seller receiving $8,500 in net proceeds, and the auctioneer making $1,275 in commission.
In this case, the buyer’s premium results in lessening the auctioneer’s commission, while keeping the seller’s net proceeds the same.
So, what have we discovered:
- If bidders disregard the buyer’s premium when bidding, the same buyer’s premium nets the seller and auctioneer more.
- If bidders correctly calculate the effect of the buyer’s premium, the seller nets a bit more, and the auctioneer earns a bit less.
- If bidders miscalculate the effect of the buyer’s premium, the seller nets about the same, and the auctioneer earns less.
Mike Brandly, Auctioneer, CAI, AARE has been an auctioneer and certified appraiser for over 30 years. His company’s auctions are located at: Mike Brandly, Auctioneer, Keller Williams Auctions and Goodwill Columbus Car Auction. His Facebook page is: www.facebook.com/mbauctioneer. He serves as Adjunct Faculty at Columbus State Community College and is Executive Director of The Ohio Auction School.
Auction Law said:
Great article, Mike. Well, for a reasoned approach for a mathematician.
However, there is only one minor flaw in all of it. You also hinted at that flaw in some of your other posts, including the recent on regarding the buyer hypnosis.
The flaw is that if you ask someone what they would do, given a chance to think about it, they will most likely answer as your respondent did and claim that they would decrease their bid accordingly. However, the one thing that is missed, is that people don’t act rationally and when someone is bidding against them, they may often readjust their predetermined price depending on their want and desire. Of course, this doesn’t apply solely to auctions, as anyone in sales learns how to encourage people to buy based on emotional factors that often bring about the sale. Hence, the old adage, “Sell the sizzle, not the steak.”
Therefore, the last mathematical hypothesis is the least probable of the three you provided. As the previous two demonstrate, the buyer’s premium typically has little effect on the final price and although the net to the auctioneer will fall somewhere between the two, the seller will typically get as much for their property whether a buyer’s premium is used or not.
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Dan Main (@goi_dan) said:
Hi Mike. Really interesting article, but it’s not correct to say that Mr Wu is assuming that buyers premium is not affecting the price paid by the bidder. His formulas specifically say that V is the value of the asset to the buyer, which is hammer price plus buyers premium. The examples he gives assume that the value is consistently $1,000,000, so for 10% bp and 10% sellers commission, the hammer price would be $909,090.91, the value (hammer plus bp) would be $1,000,000, and the seller would receive $818,181.82.
The mistake Wu does make is when combining commission rates. It is not possible to calculate the total rate by adding the 9.09% bp (i.e. bp as sellers commission) and the 10% commission to come up with 19.09%, the actual amount in the example given is 18.18%. This can be seen more clearly in extreme examples of bp and commission – e.g. if you had 90% bp and 90% commission, the combined rate would be 94.74% not 180%!
Having said all this, it is another question entirely whether or not the buyers all adjust their bids taking into account the buyers premium. As you suggest, it is perfectly possible that they make flawed adjustments based on incorrect percentage calculations, or indeed as the commenter above mentions, that the buyers premium has less of an effect than anticipated on buyer behaviour.
Mike Brandly, Auctioneer, CAI, AARE said:
I find Wu’s paper largely ignoring changes in buyer’s (bidder’s) behavior. However, that isn’t the main point of my blog as you clearly see. Also, your 94.74% calculation is correct as a percent of the total commission on the total contract price, but adding the two is correct when compared to the hammer price.
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Barbara King said:
Who gets the buyers premuim the person who owns the property being sold or the auctioneer
Mike Brandly, Auctioneer, CAI, AARE said:
Either/both depending upon their agreement. Typically the auctioneer.
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